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Preface 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed, and 
how does the implementation of such agreements influence their effectiveness? These are 
the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments (IEC). " 
Virtually all international environmental commitments must be "domesticated"-- 
transformed into domestic rules before they can affect the individuals, firms and 
organizations that international environmental agreements ultimately aim to influence. 
The domestication of international commitments is a relatively new topic, but scholars 
will learn much from the extensive studies conducted over the last three decades on 
implementation of domestic policies and programs. In this paper, Adil Najam reviews the 
main works, trends and concepts in the policy implementation literature. He also reviews 
the distinct literature on policy implementation in developing countries. Finally, he 
synthesizes the reviewed literature into five clusters of critical variables that explain 
success and failure in policy implementation. That 5C protocol is an organizing 
framework for conducting and assessing research into policy implementation, including 
implementation of international environmental commitments. 
This work was initiated during the summer of 1994 while Adil Najam visited the 
IEC project at IIASA. His visit was financed by IIASA's North-South Fund and is part 
of an effort by the IEC project to explore the potential development and application of 
theories to explain implementation in developing countries. 
T he principal concern that motivates this paper is the domestic implementation of 
international committments. The task it sets 
itself, however, is not an understanding of how 
international environmental committments 
come about, nor of how they are translated 
into national policies. Rather, it narrows its 
focus on what happens, or is likely to happen, 
in the implementation of policies at the 
domestic level. It seeks to learn, therefore, 
from the existing literature on domestic policy 
implementation. 
This paper is built on the assumption that 
most, if not all, international committments 
have to be 'domesticated' before they are 
actually implemented and the premise that 
scholars of international environmental affairs 
have not paid sufficient attention to the 
accumulated learning on domestic policy 
implementation. It sets out, therefore, to 
systematically review the literature on domestic 
implementation and synthesize from it the 
cri t ical  explanatory variables about 
implementation that students of international 
environmental policy may find useful. 
The first, introductory, chapter sets out why it 
is important for students of international 
environmental policy to learn from the 
literature on domestic implementation and 
defines the task of the paper as reviewing the 
analytic literature on the implementation of 
domestic policies in a variety of issue areas 
and in different national settings, including 
industrialized and developing countries. 
The second chapter provides a quick review of 
the development of the learning in the field by 
ident i fy ing th ree  ' genera t ions '  of 
implementation research: the first ('classical') 
generation began with the assumption that 
implementation would happen 'automatically' 
once the appropriate policies had been 
authoritatively proclaimed; the second 
('empirical') generation set out to challenge 
this assumption, to explain implementation 
'failure' through detailed case studies, and to 
demonstrate that implementation, much like 
policy formulation, was a complex political 
process  ra ther  than a mechanical  
administrative one; the third ('analytic') 
generation, by contrast, has been less 
concerned with specific implementation failure 
and more with understanding how 
implementation works in general and how its 
prospects might be improved. 
The third chapter argues that despite a 
multitude of stylized 'models', 'frameworks', 
'approaches' and 'perspectives' on the 
subject, the field of implementation is still 
characterized by little cumulative, theoretical 
understanding of how policy implementation 
'works'. This chapter reviews the most 
influential  analyt ic  scholarship  on 
implementation and identifies the major 
debate on the subject as one between the so- 
called 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' schools. 
However, there is a growing feeling amongst 
scholars that elements of both perspectives 
may be correct and a resulting efforts to 
construct synthesis models that try to account 
for these strengths. In reviewing the analytic 
literature on policy implementation in 
developing countries, the chapter concludes 
that the models proposed and the explanatory 
variables identified as being important for 
developing countries are not unsimilar to those 
being suggested for industrialized countries, 
although implementation is likely to be even 
more complex and difficult in developing 
countries than it is elsewhere. Most 
importantly, this chapter concludes that despite 
lingering conceptual differences between 
bottom-up and top-down scholars, there are 
important and persistent commonalties in the 
explanatory variables identified by a multitude 
of scholars working on different issues, in 
different national settings and political 
systems, and adhering to different conceptual 
views of the field. 
The remaining bulk of the paper, chapter #4, 
builds on the literature review of the previous 
two chapters to synthesize a set of five 
interlinked 'critical' variables which, it is 
argued, can explain implementation success or 
failure in a wide variety of policy issues (e.g., 
environment, education, population), types 
(e.g., distributive, regulatory), political systems 
(e.g., federal unitary, etc.), and levels of 
economic development (industrialized and 
developing countries): 
The Content of the policy itself-what it 
sets out to do (i.e. goals); how it 
problemitizes the issue (i.e. causal theory); 
how it aims to solve the perceived problem 
(i.e. methods). 
The nature of the institutional Context- 
The corridor (often structured as operating 
procedures) through which policy must 
travel, and by whose boundaries it is 
limited, in the process of implementation. 
Clients and Coalitions 
Context 
Commitment Capacity 
l'he Commitment of those entrusted with 
carrying out implementation at various 
levels to the goals, causal theory, and 
methods of the policy. 
The adminis t ra t ive  C a p u c i  t v  of 
implementers to carry out the changes 
desired of them. 
The support of Clients and Coal i t ions  
whose interests are enhanced or threatened 
by the policy, and the strategies they 
employ i n  strengthening or deflecting its 
implementation. 
R E t I D E K ' S  G U I D E :  At a minimum, this 
paper is designed to be a primer on 
re sea rch  on d o m e s t i c  pol icy  
implementation. Chapters #7 and #3 can 
be read independently as a 'state of the 
literature report' while chapter #4 attempts 
a more interpretive contribution i n  
synthesizing (as opposed to merely 
presenting) the learning thus far. Those 
already familiar with the literature on the 
sub.ject can easily skip to chapter #3 
directly. 
By virtue of their very mandate chapters 
# 9  and #3 attempt to cover a lot of 
material and ground i n  u fairly limited 
amount of space. The tussle to do justice 
to what is ri broad and complex field while 
also attempting to keep the discussion 
concise but informed enough to be both 
rnunageable and intelligible for readers not 
familiar with the field has nowhere been 
easy. Two caveats are. therefore, 
important. First, that the selection of the 
materiril i n  these chapters is representuti\,e 
rather than exhausti\*c \ \ , i th  a decided bias 
for penerr11 analvtic rather than case 
oriented expositions. Second, that the The paper \.ie\\fs i~tr~~lc~rrottcrrio~t e s (I tl~~tcr~rric~ presentation of the material liinls at 
~v(~c'c'.s.v of ~~c,goritrtiort her\t~c~crt rr~~rltiplc ere-rors. proiriding a flavor of the rese;irch and its 
ol~c~rrrrir~g crrrtl r,rrrltil~lc~ Ic,~.c,ls. \\*irllirt clrttl direction rather t l i r~n  a detailed critique. I~ern.c*c~rr ,,lrrlriple or-~trrti:crtiori?;. This c;ill for 
underst~inding implementatio~i i n  all  its 
manifest conlplexity. ho\ve\.er. is not an 
invitation to analytic anarchy. Rather. i t  is 
merely a recognition of a complexity which is. 
i n  fact. cndemic to policy processes. I n  
understanding implcmentcltion as a complex 
political process. rather than a mechanical 
admin i s t r a t ive  o n e .  the  s tudy of 
implementation becomes an  attempt to unraL.t.1 
the complexity-and, ultimately. to 'manage' 
it. I t  is suggested that the set of five critical 
\lnriables (the 5C Protocol) identified i n  this 
paper can assist i n  the unra\.elin,o, and possibly 
i n  the n1:111agement, of complex  
implementation processes. 
?lie Unicorn.. . stoodfor some time b o k i y  at her with an air 
of the deepest disjust. 
"Wht-is-tCiis?"he said at hut. 
('%is is a child/" Haiaglia replied eajerLj, comiy in front 
of AQe to introduce h r ,  and spreading out both his hands 
towards h r  in an Ayb-Saxon attitude. "We on4 found it 
today. It's as large as hie, and twice as natural/" 
"I always thunght they were fabubtlc monsters!" said tIie 
Unicorn. "Is it abe?" 
" ~ t  can talk " said Hagha sokmnLj. 
%e Unicorn looked dream$ at Afice, and said, T a l k  
child. " 
Alice could not he4 her fips cculinng up into a smik as sIie 
began: "Do you know, I always t h u j h t  Unicorns were 
fa6uCous monsters, too. I never saw one a h e  6ejore!" 
"Wel6 now that we have seen eat5 other," said t h  Unicorn, 
"If you'll believe in me, I'll believe in you. Is that a 
bargain?" 
"yes, if you like," said Alke. 
- From ?liroungh the Loo&q ~ l a s  
%y LEWIS CA!l(!l(OLL 
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INTRODUCTION: Learning from # 1 the Literature on Implementation 
Before I built a wall 
I'd ask to know 
What I was walling in 
Or walling out 
- ROBERT FROST 
In a special issue of Policy Analysis on implementation, guest editor Walter Williams (1975: 
458) observed that "there is a Kafkaesque aspect to the implementation area.. . It is a crucial 
area, yet people act as if it didn't exist." He was writing in the early years of what turned out 
to be a decade of intense focus on the subject by scholars of policy science. The results of this 
attention, however, have been mixed. A substantial volume of scholarship has been produced 
and the earlier view that implementation was merely an administrative chore which, once the 
policy had been legislated and the agencies mandated with administrative authority, would 
happen of and by itself has been debunked. However, while the complexity inherent in 
implementation processes has been amply demonstrated, we are still nowhere near a widely 
accepted causal theory with predictive or prescriptive powers. 
More recently, a new wave of interest in implementation studies has emerged from students of 
international environmental regimes.' For most part, however, this new stream of scholarship 
has shown little interest in the accumulated learning of earlier research on domestic policy 
implementation.2 Moreover, even though the incantations about the importance of accounting 
for and being sensitive to local factors are repeated and frequent, the focus of such research 
remains decidedly state-centric. Most importantly, assumptions about state behavior in the 
international arena are unquestioningly, and unjustifiably, transposed to state behavior in the 
domestic arena. Despite claims about the need to 'open' the so-called 'black box' of the state, 
there seems a marked hesitancy to do open it fully, lest it turns out to be a proverbial Pandora's 
box. 
In making their "plea for the semi-complex rational actor" Andresen, Skjaseth, and Wettestad 
(1995) go the farthest in challenging the sacrosanct concept of the state, developed for 
international affairs, as being the appropriate unit of analysis for studying implementation. It is 
the claim of this paper, however, that even they do not go far enough. Whatever we may want 
to believe at the international level, at the domestic level the state is never a unitary actor, nor 
necessarily rational. Even though they may provide a useful framework at the international 
level, concepts such as state willingness, national concern, or governmental capacity have 
limited, and only the most general, utility at the domestic, and especially the local, level by 
which time the state has already disintegrated into myriad organizations, agencies, and actors 
pursuing different, often conflicting, interests and strategies. It is in the space defined by the 
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complex web of interactions between the various substatal and societal actors, their contending 
interests, and their preferred strategies, that the ultimate effectiveness of any implementation 
process is defined. I submit that this space cannot be recognized, let alone be understood, until 
the 'black box' of the state is fully opened.3 
Using the lens of the empirical and analytic research on domestic policy implementation in 
industrialized as well as developing countries, this paper is an attempt to understand domestic 
state action in all its manifest complexity. This paper assumes that international commitments 
have to be 'domesticated' before they can be implemented. That is, international commitments 
are-in most, if not all, cases--converted into domestic policies before they are implemented. 
Even programs that may emanate in international institutions will require some level of 
approval by national authorities and involvement of domestic agencies. The broader study of 
implementing international environmental commitments must obviously include the process by 
which international commitments are translated into national policies. This paper, however, 
focuses more narrowly on what happens to international commitments after they become 
national policies and programs. Our principal concern, then, is the domestic implementation of 
international comrnitrnent~.~ 
The need to look at the implementation of international committments at subnational levels is all 
the more important for students of environmental regimes, which often require changes in the 
behavior of individuals; in many cases of individuals residing at the periphery of state 
influence, or even beyond--e.g., a pastoralist in the African Sahel or a gatherer deep in the 
Amazon. Even in less dramatic cases--e.g., small firms dumping toxins in a nearby stream or 
illegally exporting them-there is a need to go beyond "the logic of two-level games" (Putnam, 
1988) and to bring more than just "the second image (back) in" (Ziirn, 1993), since the process 
of putting policy into action is more akin to "a Russian doll of implementation-within- 
implementation" (Berman, 1978: 176).5 
Our belief that, like all politics, all implementation is ultimately local does not, in any way, 
belittle the importance of international factors. It merely implies that: a) international factors 
will influence the implementation process only in conjunction with domestic factors; b) the 
most important influence of the international factors is likely to be on how they impact, and 
potentially reshape, the domestic variables; and c) the general explanatory variables that may 
account for the domestic implementation of international committments are likely to be the same 
as the variables that account for the domestic implementation of domestic p01icy.~ 
This line of argumentation leads to the realization that any attempt to understand the 
implementation of international commitments must, at a very minimum, be true to (and 
potentially build upon) the accumulated learning on domestic implementation. This paper, 
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then, proceeds to survey and synthesize this accumulated learning. Its target readers are 
students of international environmental regimes, but it consciously seeks the legitimacy of its 
arguments by invoking the literature on domestic implernentati~n.~ Its examples and 
expositions, even where not directly environmental, are deliberately chosen to be relevant to 
students of environmental regimes and especial care has been taken to choose them from both 
industrialized and developing countries and on more complex policy issues. The argument is 
that any framework that claims to be general must be applicable to the potentially most difficult 
cases, and if it is, then it is likely to also be applicable to other cases.8 
At the minimum, then, this paper is designed to be a primer on domestic implementation 
research. The next two chapters present a 'state of the literature report.' Imbedded in this 
literature review is a plea to the students of international environmental regimes to learn from 
this important stream of scholarship, lest they be condemned to repeat the same mistakes and 
reinvent the same wheels. 
The fourth chapter sets for itself a much more ambitious goal. For Lester et al. (1987: 208), 
the most important task for implementation scholars is to identify the "critical" variables. This 
chapter attempts to do exactly that, heeding also to the advice from O'Toole (1986: 203) to 
"build systematically and cumulatively" on earlier empirical research. Chapters #2 and #3 show 
that although the literature on domestic implementation is exceptionally rich in empirical 
evidence, it is seriously fragmented in way of broadly accepted causal theories. More recently, 
attempts have been made to arrive at synthesis theories that accommodate various perspectives 
(e.g., Sabatier, 1986; Goggin et al., 1990). This paper does not pretend to construct a 
particular theory about how implementation 'works'. In fact, implicit to our argument is the 
realization that any attempt to arrive at neat and precise grand theories about the process of 
implementation is an effort of dubious potential. This paper does, however, suggest a set of 
explanatory variables for the analytic study of implementation that is based on a synthesis of 
the, now abundant, literature on the subject. 
Our survey of the literature shows that there is already a remarkable convergence on the critical 
explanatory variables identified by scholars of the two schools. Moreover, researchers 
working in a number of different issue areas (e.g. environment, population, health, crime 
prevention, etc.) have consistently identified the same, or similar, variables; as have scholars 
working in countries at various stages of economic development. We lower our sights, 
therefore, from the grandiose exercise of suggesting a unified causal theory, to identifying 
generally applicable critical explanatory variables. This paper identifies five such interlinked 
variables-or, 'the 5C protocol': 
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The Con ten t  of the policy itself-what i t  sets out to do (i.e. goals); how i t  
problemitizes the issue (i.e. causal theory); how it aims to solve the perceived problem 
(i.e. methods). 
The nature of the institutional Context-The corridor (often structured as standard 
operating procedures) through which policy must travel, and by whose boundaries i t  is 
limited, in the process of implementation. 
The Comnlitnlent of those entrusted with carrying out the inlplenlentation at various 
levels to the goals, c;lilsal theory. and methods of the policy. 
The administrative Capacity of implementers to carry out the changes desired of them. 
The support of Clients and Coalitions whose interests are enhanced 01. threatened by 
the policy, and the strategies they employ in strengthening or deflecting its 
implementation. 
Clients and Coalitions 
Context 
Capacity 
There should be no surprises, pcr sr; in the 
choice of these 'critical' variables for students 
of domestic public policy-or, for that 
matter, for students of international 
environmental regimes. What is impol-tant in 
this set of vm-iables, however, is not their 
choice. but their exposition. Inlplicit in this 
exposition are three clailns (cach potentially 
controversial) that need to be made cxplicit. 
The first two, more funda~nental, of these relate to the larger scholarship on domestic policy 
implementation and derive from the synthesizing nature of this study: 
First. a claini to general acceptability. Although particular scholars. advocating 
particular theoretical perspectives (e.2.. top-down or bottom-up), may place different 
priorities on the five explanatory factors identified here, i t  is susgested that. for most 
part, the overall importance of these factors within the implementation process would 
be acceptable to scholars from all schools. 
Second, a claim to general applicability. Altho~lgh each specific episode of 
inlplementation will invariably have features specific to itself, i t  is susgested that the 
five broad variables identified in our synthesis of the scholarship provide a powerfill 
framework for analyzing implen~entation in various issue areas ( e . ~ .  environment. 
population, health, crime prevention, etc.); at its various levels (e.g., international, 
domestic, local); under various governance systems (e.g., federal, unitary, centrally 
planned, locally controlled); and, most importantly, in both industrialized and 
developing countries. 
This paper's third claim pertains specifically those studying the implementation of international 
environmental committments: 
Third, a claini to specific relevance. I t  is concluded that those interested in 
implementing international environnlental comnlittments have much to learn from the 
li~erature on domestic policy implementarion. Moreover, i t  is suggeslcd that the five 
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critical variables identified here are directly, and especially, relevant to the study of the 
domestic implementation of international environmental committments. At one level, it 
is encouraging that the variables that emerge from this survey of the literature on 
domestic implementation are strikingly similar to those being suggested by scholars of 
international environmental regimesB9 At another level, however, although the labels 
and broad intent are similar, important-ven fundamental-difference~ are apparent in 
the richness of detail, the focus on local factors, and the level of interlinkages between 
various explanatory factors. In fact, many students of international regime still seem to 
be clinging to some long discredited assumptions about implementation, including the 
often implicit belief that the process is governmentally 'controlled' at the top and 
effective implementation may simply be a matter of getting the administrative levers 
right. Although international environmental treaties are signed by states, they are 
invariably implemented by substatal and societal actors. It is, therefore, suggested that 
the clues to understanding the implementation puzzle will be found in understanding the 
interests, motivations, and strategies of these actors. Moreover, such an understanding 
is much better facilitated by learning from the accumulated wisdom of the scholarship 
on domestic policy implementation and using the variables that emerge from such 
learning. 
- 
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Three Generations of #2 Implementation Research 
Between the idea 
And the real ib 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow 
- T.S. ELIOT 
In their seminal text, Implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) uncovered many 
surprises and unmasked many myths. One of these concerned the literature on the subject: 
There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in the social sciences-r so we 
have been told by numerous people.. . . It must be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There 
is a kind of semantic illusion at work here because everything ever done in public policy or public 
administration must, in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation .... Nevertheless, 
expect for the few pieces mentioned in the body of this book, we have been unable to find any 
significant analytic work dealing with implementation.10 (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 166) 
Writing five years later, however, Paul Berman (1978: 158) noted that "now implementation is 
'in.' Everyone seems to be studying it, if not solving its problems." Indeed, since Pressman 
and Wildavsky's book-and, in some ways, because of it-the literature has burgeoned. So 
has the realization of the importance of the subject. So much so, that Goggin et al. (1990:9) 
believe that "the nineties are likely to be the implementation era." However, they also point out 
that "scholars who study implementation.. . have yet to come up with an agreed-upon theory 
that adequately explains why those who implement public policies behave as they do.. . there is 
still no widespread agreement among those who do implementation research about what 
actually constitutes a case of implementation. There is still some confusion over when 
implementation begins, when it ends, and how many types of implementation there are." 
Indicative of the 'state of the literature' is the profusion of definitions of implementation used 
by scholars of the subject (see Box 1). Despite the fact that there is reasonable consensus on 
the general meaning of the term (Berman, 1978: 159), the nuances of stress and scope within 
the definitions suggested by leading scholars-plus the tendency to propose new ones rather 
than using ones already proposed-suggests a field still searching for its boundaries within the 
larger discipline of policy science. This sense is even more pronounced in other aspects of 
implementation scholarship-nowhere more so than on causal, predictive theory-building. 
The tendency, among implementation scholars, to lament the absence of a theory is not new 
(Hargrove, 1975; Palumbo and Harder, 1981; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; Alexander, 
1982; O'Toole, 1986; Lester et al., 1987); nor are attempts to devise 'conceptual frameworks' 
and 'theoretical perspectives' that might serve as, or grow into, surrogate theories (Smith, 
1973; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Berman, 1978; Elmore, 1978; Rein and Rabinovitz, 
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1978; Scharpf, 1978; Edwards, 1980; Hjern and Porter, 198 1; Hanf, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 
1982; Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Hargrove, 1983; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Mitnick 
and Backoff, 1984; Alexander, 1985; Sabatier, 1986; Linder and Peters, 1987; Goggin et al., 
1990). However, despite the profusion of empirical case studies, competing 'frameworks,' 
and stylized 'approaches,' the literature on implementation remains "long on description and 
short on prescription" (Elmore, 1979: 601) and riddled with "proverbs" (O'Toole, 1986: 200). 
BOX 1: Defining Implementation 
Implementation, according to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xiii-xv), "means just what 
Webster [dictionary] and Roget [thesaurus] say it does: to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, 
complete." According to their seminal book on the subject: "Policies imply theories.. . Policies become 
programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created.. . Implementation, then, is the 
ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result." 
A more specific definition is provided by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 447-8): "Policy 
implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at 
the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions." They make a clear distinction between 
the interrelated concepts of implementation, performance, and impact and stress Dolbeare's (1974) 
observation that impact studies typically ask "What happened?" whereas implementation studies ask 
"Why did it happen?" 
Eugene Bardach (1977: 55-6) introduces the concept of 'games' as "classified according to the 
nature of their stakes" as a "master metaphor" to understand, what he calls, the "implementation 
problem." Before going on to define implementation as the playing out of a number of loosely 
interrelated games," he defends his metaphor by arguing that: "It directs us to look at the players, what 
they regard as the stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play (which 
stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules of 'fair' play (which stipulate the boundaries beyond 
which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the nature of the communications (or lack of them) among the players, 
and the degree of uncertainty surrounding possible outcomes. The game metaphor also directs our 
attention to who is not willing to play and for what reasons, and to who insists on changes in some of 
the game's parameters as a condition for playing." 
In an influential paper Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 308) describe implementation as "the point at 
which intent gets translated into action." Their conceptual definition of implementation is "(1) a 
declaration of government preferences, (2) mediated by a number of actors who (3) create a circular process 
characterized by reciprocal power relations and negotiations." They see the "politics of implementation" 
as being an attempt to resolve conflicts between three imperatives: "the legal imperative to do what is 
legally required; the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible; and the 
consensual imperative to do what can establish agreement among contending influential parties who have 
a stake in the outcome." 
In one of the few attempts to model implementation in developing countries Merilee Grindle 
(1980a: 5-6) provides a generic definition: "[l:t] is an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of 
actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the program being pursued and by 
the interaction of the decision makers within a given politico-administrative context." 
Paul Berman (1978) and Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) define implementation simply as 
the process of carrying out an authoritative decision-i.e. a policy choice. On a similar note, Edwards 
(1980: 1) defines it as "the stage of policymaking between the establishment of a policy-such as the 
passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or 
the promulgation of a regulatory rule-and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it 
affects." 
Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983: 4) concept of policy implementation is "those events and 
activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include both the 
effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and events." The 'working definition' 
employed by Hargrove (1983: 281) includes two components: "(a) the actions required by law are carried 
out; and (b) those actions encompass both formal compliance with the law and organizational routines 
consistent with compliance." Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O'Toole (1990: 34) define 
implementation as a "process, a series of.. . decisions and actions directed toward putting an already- 
decided ... mandate into effect." They develop a 'communications model' to implementation where 
"messages, their senders, and the messages' recipients are the critical ingredients" and "decoding these 
messages and absorbing them into agency routine is what implementation is all about" (p. 40). 
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A widely accepted model of the causal processes of implementation still remains, what 
Hargrove (1975) had called the "missing link" in social policy. As Lester et al. (1987: 208-9) 
point out: 
Implementation research has been too restricted in  time (i.e., an emphasis on cross-sectional versus 
longitudinal analysis), too restricted in number (i.e., an emphasis on case study versus comparative 
analyses), too restricted i n  policy type (i.e., an emphasis on single policy type versus multiple policy 
types), too restricted in defining the concept of implementation (i.e., limited to a single output measure 
versus multiple measures), and too restricted in  approach (i.e., the utilization of either "top-down" or 
"bottom-up" approach versus both). 
Having said that, the literature has, in fact, come a long way in highlighting the inevitable 
complexity of the implementation process and the saliency of trying to understand this 
complexity. This chapter will briefly review the evolution of implementation research over the 
last twenty years. Although any attempt to arrange the literature on implementation is bound to 
be arbitrary, we nonetheless try to classify it heuristically along three 'generations' of scholarly 
thinking on implementation questions.12 In shorthand, the first ('classical') generation of 
thinking on the subject began with the assumption that implementation would happen 
'automatically' once the appropriate policies had been authoritatively proclaimed. The second 
('empirical') generation set out to challenge this assumption, to explain implementation 'failure' 
in specific cases, and to demonstrate that implementation was a political process no less 
complex (and often more so) than policy formulation. The third ('analytic') generation, by 
contrast, has been less concerned with specific implementation failure and more with 
understanding how implementation works in general and how its prospects might be improved. 
Although the three generations represent a continuum of increasing understanding about 
implementation, this is a not strict chronological arrangement.l3 
GENERATION #I: A cog in the administration machine14 
Peter deLeon (1994: 77) points out that "the policy sciences may be characterized as having a 
long history (if they are defined in terms of advice to rulers) and a short past (if they are 
defined as a systematic, institutionalized approach to improved governance)." This general 
observation is all the more true for policy implementation. Hjern and Hull (1982: 107; see also 
Hjern 1982) trace the antecedents of the "classical" view of administration and implementation 
to early 'constitutionalist' theorists. Quoting Hume, they suggest that his and his successors' 
political methodology could be labeled the 'single-authority, top-down' approach to political 
organization [and, thereby, to policy implementation]: "So great is the force of laws and of 
particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humors and tempers 
of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them 
as any which the mathematical sciences afford us."15 
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Administration was, therefore, conceived as being 'scientific', 'rational', 'predictable7-and, 
ultimately, 'machine-like'. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980: 7- 10) suggest that this 'classical' 
model of policy administration was based on three basic concepts which helped make the 
'machine' the metaphor and model for the study of administration-and helped foster the view 
that implementation was but an automatic cog within the rationalized administrative machine. 
The first was a Weberian framework of the ideal bureaucracy being a firmly ordered 'system' 
with highly rationalized, legalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical structures, where a small 
group of decision makers at the top create policy and subordinates at the bottom dutifully carry 
it out.16 Second, Woodrow Wilson, in an influential 1887 paper on the subject, forwarded the 
thesis that policy formulation and policy implementation are-and should be-two separate and 
distinct activities; with the later being neutral, professionalized, and nonpolitical.17 Third, 
Frederick Taylor's influential work, The Principle of Scientific Management, provided the 
rationale for adopting 'efficiency' as the basic criterion for evaluating administrative 
performance.18 The resulting 'rational' model was based on three concepts: organizational 
hierarchy, the separation of politics, and efficiency. For precisely these reasons, it minimized 
the significance of implementation. 
As Smith (1973: 198) points out, the assumption was that "once [an 'efficient'] policy has been 
'made' by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy 
will be near those expected by the policymakers." The 'orthodoxy' maintained that "politics (in 
the sense of making policy), and administration (in the sense of carrying out policy) are totally 
discrete realms or wholly separate stages in the policy process" (Burke, 1987: 217). Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975: 450) add that under the classical model "the implementation 
process is assumed to be a series of mundane decisions and interactions unworthy of the 
attention of scholars seeking the heady stuff of politics.. . Most of the crucial policy issues are 
often seen to have been resolved in the prior decisions of executives, legislators, and judges." 
GENERATION #2: Implementation is complex and 'nothing works'lg 
The limitations of the 'classical' model, however, began to be highlighted in the post World 
War-I1 period as it became apparent that public policy worked less as an efficient and orderly 
machine and more as a process of "muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959). Such limitations 
were brought into sharp relief as the scope and span of government dramatically enlarged in 
both the United States (largely because of President Johnson's "Great Society" program) and 
in Western Europe (largely because of post-War reconstruction and social welfare programs). 
A number of case studies in the U.S.-e.g.,  Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1970) Maximum 
Feasible Misunderstanding and Martha Derthick's (1972) New Towns Zn-Town-showed that 
the grand policies of the 1960s were not working the way they were 'supposed' to under the 
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classical model. At the same time, scholarship in public administration and organizational 
behavior (e.g., Simon, 1947; Kaufman, 1960; Etozioni, 1964) was revealing that 
administration-and implementation-were far more complex, and political, than the classical 
assumptions had suggested them to be. 
Theodore Lowi (1969), argued that the expansion of government was attempting to control the 
more universal aspects of human behavior-or "the environment of conductm-and that 
democratic norms of accountability and responsibility were being undermined by the allocation 
of too much discretionary authority to implementers. The alternative was to return to the 
comfort of a more structured model of making and implementing policy. However, as 
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980: 12) point out, "once the Pandora's box had been opened it 
was not easy to close it." 
The first generation of scholars were faulted for underestimating the complexity of 
implementation processes; the second generation set out to record the magnitude of this 
complexity through detailed empirical studies. Scholars of this generation meticulously 
documented specific case studies and showed how complex implementation really was and 
why it was a folly to assume that just because a policy had been proclaimed, it would be 
implemented. A large collection of carefully documented case studies pointed to a consistent 
pattern: "grand pretensions, faulty execution, puny results" (Elmore, 1978: 186). The 
predictions of this scholarship were decidedly pessimistic as the outpouring of case studies 
reiterated the familiar conclusion: "the best laid plans of social reform invariably go astray" 
(Berman, 1978: 158). Moreover, according to Linder and Peters (1987: 460) "most of this 
work.. . involved essentially a cataloging approach to the barriers to perfect administration, 
describing them and (in some instances) analyzing their characteristics, but really doing little 
else to aid in the development of effective policymaking systems." 
While Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are the most prominent exemplar of this genre of 
research, the general mood of this generation is caught by Bardach in The Implementation 
Game (1977: 3): 
It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. It is harder still to 
formulate them i n  words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the 
constituencies to which they are responsive. And it  is excruciatingly hard to implement them in  a way 
that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients. 
Stating at the outset that "this is not an optimistic book" (p. 6), Bardach concludes with the 
recommendation that it is "essential to become more modest in our demands on, and 
expectations of, the institutions of representative government" (p. 283). 
Although criticized for being atheoretical, case-specific, noncumulative, and overly pessimistic, 
research in this generation served several important purposes-not the least of which was to 
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demonstrate that implementation could not be taken for granted as the classical model had 
implied. Goggin et al. (1990: 13-14) list some contributions: a) it shifted the focus from how a 
bill becomes a law to how a law becomes a program; b) it demonstrated the complex and 
dynamic nature of implementation; c) it emphasized the importance of policy subsystems; d) it 
identified a number of factors that seemed to account for programmatic results, especially 
failure; and e) it diagnosed several treatable pathologies that periodically plague implementing 
actors. To generalize very broadly, the methodology of choice for implementation scholars of 
this generation was detailed case-studies (Lester et al., 1987: 201); the purpose was to 
highlight the complexity of implementation processes, often taking a "horrors of war" approach 
(Linder and Peters, 1987: 460); and the mood was predominantly pessimistic (Goggin et al., 
1990: 13). 
GENERATION #3: The search for implementation theory20 
Writing in 1978, Paul Berman suggested (p. 179): 
The battle for recognition of implementation as a critical element of policy-making has been won. But 
the analysis of implementation is just moving beyond the stages of isolated case studies and applied 
wisdom. It is time to design research so that knowledge from individual studies in different policy 
sectors can be cumulated and compared. 
Others had already begun coming to, and were increasingly arriving at, similar conclusions. It 
was the realization of the absence of (and the need for) causal understanding, organizing 
frameworks, conceptual models, analytic approaches, and-ultimately-explanatory and 
predictive theories that ushered in the third generation of thinking on implementation. Whereas 
the second generation had invested its energies in empirically documenting why specific 
episodes of implementation 'failed', this generation set as its goal an analytic understanding of 
how implementation 'worked' generally.z1 However, despite a frenzy of research in this area 
and a multitude of 'theory building' attempts, O'Toole's (1986: 185) survey of over 300 
published studies concludes that: 
Researchers do not agree on the outlines of a theory of implementation nor even on the variables 
crucial to implementation success. Researchers, for most part implicitly, also disagree on what should 
constitute implementation success, especially in the multi-actor setting. But even among those who 
seem to share assumptions on this issue, for instance those who utilize an unambiguously top-down 
perspective and seek to execute the wishes of a central sovereign, there seems to be considerable 
diversity. 
In all fairness, the task of this generation-building 'implementation theory'-has been an 
ambitious one from the beginning. All the more so given the major findings of the previous 
generation of scholarship-i.e. that implementation is complex and prone to subverting the best 
laid-out plans-plus the added problems of a) too few truly comparative, longitudinal, and 
synthetic studies and b) 'overdeterminantion,' or too many variables and too few cases (Lester 
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et al., 1987; Goggin, et al., 1990; Andresen et al., 1995). Some might even argue that to 
arrive at precise predictive theories and foolproof prescriptions about the complex political and 
administrative phenomenon called policy implementation is itself an exercise in futility. In 
writing about public management [which includes implementation], Altshuler (1988: 644) 
argues that, although desirable, "such theories are unavailable and ... such prescriptions 
represent quackery." In an important paper on the subject, Robert Behn (1988) suggests that it 
is simply impossible to develop the perfect plan from the beginning and the very best that 
public managers can, and should, do is to "grope along." 
Having said all of the above, the contribution of this generation of implementation research 
must not go underappreciated. Despite the fact that there remains a lack of cumulation or 
convergence in the field and that predictive implementation theory remains elusive, this 
generation of scholarship has substantially enhanced our understanding of the important 
clusters of variables that can impact implementation (see next two chapters). As O'Toole 
(1986: 203) attests, and as this paper will argue, despite important normative disagreements 
between scholars there is a remarkable implicit convergence on the choice of major factors 
important within the larger implementation process. 
The debate between scholars of this generation has yielded a number of increasingly more 
refined analytic models of the implementation process, an extended list of potential explanatory 
variables, and at least two major theoretical streams of thought: 1) a top-down approach which 
begins with the central decisionmaker and the authoritative policy statement and proceeds 
downwards through the hierarchical administrative structure to examine the extent to which the 
policy's legally-mandated objectives were achieved and procedures followed; and 2) a bottom- 
up approach which starts with an analysis of the many actors who interact at the operational 
(local) level and works backwards to map the outcomes and impacts of the policy in terms of 
the strategies adopted by the relevant actors in response to the particular policy choice. A more 
extended sampler of the nuances of the debate between the two perspectives is presented in 
Box 2. 
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BOX 2: The Big Debate: Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up 
The single most important faultline in the field has been that which divides a "top-down" view of 
implementation (e.g., Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; 
Linder and Peters, 1987) from a "bottom-up" view (e.g., Berman, 1978; Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 1978; 
Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1978; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and 
Porter, 198 1). 
A top-down view exemplified the earlier analytic models and has remained the more dominant genre. 
Typically, this perspective starts from the authoritative policy decision at the central (top) level of 
government and asks: a) to what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups 
consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?; b) to what extent were 
the objectives attained over time?; c) what were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and 
impacts?; and d) how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? (Sabatier, 1986: 
22). 
The bottom-up approach was, largely, a reaction to this model: based on identifying weaknesses in  i t  
and suggesting alternatives to address those weaknesses. It was suggested that "the notion that 
policymakers exercise--or ought to exercise-some kind of direct and determinary control over policy 
implementation might be called [a] 'noble lie"' (Elmore, 1979: 603); that analysis should focus "on those 
who are charged with carrying out policy rather than those who formulate and convey it" (Lipsky, 1978: 
398); because "subordinate compliance does not automatically follow upon the issuance of orders and 
instructions.. . when managers die and go to heaven, they may find themselves in charge of organizations 
in which subordinates invariably, cheerfully, and fully do as they are bid. Not here on earth" (Kaufman, 
1973: 2). A few bottom-uppers even suggested that "discretion at lower levels is not only inevitable, but 
also desirable.. . . [because] it  is necessary for policies to be 'reinvented' so that they better fit local needs" 
(Palumbo and Harder, 1981: xi). 
Moreover, i t  was argued that although "a legalistic perspective is necessary but an interorganizational 
structuring is indispensable in  implementation analysis" (Hjern, 1982: 308); because "the relationship 
between policy and action could not be regarded as a simple transmission process but rather must be 
viewed as a complex assembly job involving the fitting together of different interests and priorities.. . 
[and that implementation] is mediated by actors who may be operating with different assumptive worlds 
from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it undergoes interpretation and modification and, in 
some cases, subversion" (Fudge and Barrett, 1981: 251). Therefore, i t  was proposed that the mapping 
should be "backwards" rather than "forwards" (Elmore, 1979); that the focus should be on 
"implementation structures" (Hjern and Porter, 1981) and on the negotiation process (Barrett and Fudge, 
1981) amongst and within "networks" of implementers (Hanf, 1978); and that in realizing that "the 
implementation path of a project can thus be profoundly shaped by unforeseen and unforeseeable events" 
(Berman, 1978: 176), implementation should be designed to be "adaptive" rather than "programmed" 
(Berman, 1980). 
Even in acknowledging the general validity of some of this criticism, top-downers have not accepted 
the intensity of the bottom-uppers claims. Sabatier (1986). for example, has faulted the bottom-up 
models for: a) overemphasizing the ability of the 'bottom' to frustrate the policy mandated by those at the 
'top'; b) taking the present set of actors as a given without examining how participation is affected by the 
policy itself; c) being a-theoretical; and d) being not primarily concerned with implementation (carrying 
out) of a policy per se but rather with understanding actor interactions and response strategies to that 
policy. 
A particularly scathing critique of the bottom-up perspective comes from Linder and Peters (1987: 
463-5) who accuse this literature of conflating empirical and normative statements: "If one accepts fully 
the descriptive generalization about implementation being determined largely by the lower echelons in 
organizations also as a prescriptive statement ... then many ideas about policy control in  democratic 
political systems must be questioned ... The fundamental point remains: governance is not about 
negotiation, i t  is about the use of legitimate authority .... It is a truism that 'street level bureaucrats' 
have a great deal to do with the success or failure of public programs.. . However, to place goal definition 
in the hands of that element of the public sector (empirically, analytically or managerially) is to admit 
defeat and the inability of the policymaking hierarchies in  government to function effectively to produce 
governance." 
Elmore (1979: 610; original emphasis) provides a possible rejoinder by arguing that "the dominant 
view that discretion is, at best, a necessary evil and, at worst, a threat to democratic government pushes 
implementation analysis toward.. . increased reliance on hierarchical controls to solve implementation 
problems.. . . Compliance with orders and procedures displaces competence, or becomes the equivalent of 
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competence .... Nowhere in this view is serious thought given to how to capitalize on discretion as a 
device for improving the reliability and effectiveness of policies at the street level." 
On a related note, Hanf (1982: 160) adds that: "Models emphasizing control and steering from above 
will inevitably discover 'implementation problems' in  the form of goal displacement, uncontrolled 
discretion, inadequate coordination and other instances of 'sub-optimalization'. In an important sense, 
such implementation problems are a function of the organizational models employed in  the analysis, 
which prevent us from coming to terms with the need for (and weighing the consequences of) a strong 
element of 'local presence'." 
The sharp differences between the two approaches can lead to very divergent normative and prescriptive 
notions. Nowhere more so than on how they approach 'complexity' in the implementation process. As 
O'Toole (1986: 197) points out: "many top-downers would view the complexity and heterogeneity ... in  
multi-actor implementation with discomfort, seeing in such apparent 'confusion' the signs of failure on 
the part of the state .... [On the other hand] many bottom-uppers do not merely catalog but also find 
considerable virtue in the diversity fostered through multi-actor systems."22 
Elmore (1979: 605) summarizes the prescriptive differences that emerge: "The analytic solutions 
offered by forward mapping stresses factors that tend to centralize control and that are easily manipulated 
by policymakers: funding formulas; formal organizational structures; authority relationships among 
administrative units; regulations; and administrative controls (budget, planning, and evaluation 
requirements). The analytic solutions offered by backward mapping stresses the dispersal of control and 
concentrates on factors that can only be indirectly influenced by policymakers: knowledge and problem- 
solving ability of lower level administrators; incentive structures that operate on the subjects of policy; 
bargaining relationships among political actors at various levels of the implementation process; and the 
strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices." 
Having said all of the above-and while stressing that the big debate between top-down and bottom- 
up perspectives on implementation is by no means yet concluded-it needs to be added that a consensus 
seems to be emerging around the proposition that "it is not a question of choosing 'top' or 'bottom' as 
though these were mutually exclusive  alternative^"^^ (Hanf, 1982: 171). In fact, both perspectives 
provide useful insights into the implementation process; both demonstrate significant explanatory 
strengths as well as weaknesses; each may be more relevant to particular sets of cases than to others; in  
some cases both may be equally relevant, albeit, at different stages of the complex and dynamic 
implementation process; and, finally, there is a need to evolve new models of implementation which 
incorporate the strengths of both perspectives. (See Knoepfel and Weidner, 1982; Elmore, 1985; Sabatier 
and Hanf, 1985; Sabatier, 1986; Goggin, et al., 1990). 
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A Compendium of Models, #3 Frameworks, Approaches, and Perspectives 
GLENDOWER: I cat1 ccrll spirits fi.onr the c!rl.sty deep. 
HOTSPUR: WIry so carr I ,  or. so  cat^ arly man: 
B~it will they cotrre ~c*hetz yoli do cal1,for !/lent? 
-WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Hr,vy 1 ~ ) 2 4  
Since the findings of, what we have called, the third generation of in~plementation research are 
the most relevant to our purpose this chapter will sumniarize some of its key works before we 
go on to suggest a set of explanatory variables which builds on the lessons of the scholarship 
thus far and seeks to synthesize the commonalties within it. The flavor of this chapter is 
representative rather than exhaustive.25 The focus is specifically on key analytic works which 
develop (or challenges) explanatory 'models,' 'frameworks,' 'approaches,' or  'perspectives' 
on i r n p l e m e n t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Rather than adopt a strictly chronological approach, this chapter continues the discussion 
initiated earlier by using the debate between top-down and bottom-up scholarship as its 
organizing principle. It begins with a presentation of two early attempts and modeling policy 
implementation. It goes on, then, to discuss key influential nlodels of the top-down ancl 
bottom-up varieties which is, then, followed by a review of some more recent attempts towards 
synthesizing the two approaches into more comprehensive frameworks. Finally, this chapter 
briefly reviews a few important contributions from the analytic literature on  policy 
implementation in developing c ~ u n t r i e s . ' ~  
- 
TWO EARLY MODELS 
One of the first detailed, and still remarkably robust, model of the policy implementation was 
suggested by Thomas B. Smith (1973). Although Smith highlighted the complexity of 
implementation in a developing country context-implying that the problems of implementation 
may  be  less  p reva len t  in 
industrialized societies-it is 
interesting to note that subsequent 
implementation research in North 
America and Western Europe 
resounded many of the concerns I 1  
F~EL)DA('): - INSTITUTIONS 
raised by Smith.  Approaching FIGURE 1 : Smith's (1973) 
model o f  the policy implementation process implementation from a social and 
political change perspective, Smith begins with the recognition that by the implementation of 
any policy "old patterns of interaction and institutions are abolished or modified and new 
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patterns of action and institutions are created" (p. 200). His model, therefore, views 
implementatior~ c1.s a tension generating force in  society . A1 though presented before the term 
became popular, this may well be called one of the earliest bottom-up models of 
implementation. 
Viewing policy as a continuous process without a definite end or 'end products,' Smith argues 
that the tensions and conflicts experienced in  implementation may, or nlay not, manifest 
themselves in the crealion of new behavioral patterns and relation-ships (i.e. institutions). In 
either case, the transaction phase-where the tensions between the policy, its formulators, its 
implementers, and its targets, is articulated-will feed back into the implementation process as 
well as policy (re-) design. Smith's "tension generating matrix" (see Figure 1 )  within the 
implementation process is the interaction between four components: a) the idealizedpolicy and 
the patterns of interactions that the policy wants to induce; b) the target groLrp which is called to 
change its behavior; c) irrlplerrlenting orgarli:crtior~'s strlrctlrre, leadership, and capacity; and d) 
erzvironmerzral fnctor-s or the "constraining corridor through which the implenlentation of policy 
milst be forced." 
IWTC.1)9CAWI:1110Nl l  
COVYU,. I~. I IO~ I+.o A much more widely quoted early model 
comes from Van Meter and Van 
Horn (1975). who-essentially viewins 
. W E  D,%m4,#0*  
,,, IY.cIYI...(PI - .  implementation as a top-down process- 
attempted to consolidate the emerging 
literature into one model. In  particular. 
they use the three causes of non- 
FIGURE 2:  Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975) implementation suggested by Kaufman 
model of the policy ~mplementation process (1973: 2): "subordinates don't know 
what their superiors want, they can't do what their superiors want, or they refuse to do what 
their superiors want." Van Meter and Van Horn label these as problems of corrzrnlrnicatio~z, 
capacify, and irrlplerrlerlter clisposirion. 
Invoking Theodore Lowi's (1964) earlier work, they begin with the proposition that the nature 
of the policy itself is critical to the success, or otherwise, of its implementati~n.'~ They go on 
to suggest a model which posits six "clusters of variables" and the linkages between them 
which shapes policy and performance (see Figure 2). The variables are: a) the relevance of 
policy standards and objectives; b) policy resources; c) interorganizational communication 
and enforcement activities; d) the characteristics of the implementing agencies; e) the economic, 
social, and political environment affecting the implementing jurisdiction or organization; and f) 
the disposition of implementers for carrying out policy decisions. 
Another model-very much in the top-down communicat ion 
tradition and in many respects similar (though 
more parsimonious) than Van Meter and Van 
Horn's-was proposed by George C. 
Edwards 111 (1980). In answering the 
questions "What are the preconditions for 
successful policy implementation?" and "What 
Bureaucrat ic  
are the primary obstacles to successful policy s t ruc tu re  
implementation?" (p. 9), he identifies fo~lr  FIGURE 3: Edwards's ( 1  980) 
direct and indirect impacts on implementation 
interacting and simultaneously operating factors: 
a) communication; b) resources; c) dispositions; and d) bureaucratic structure. (See Figure-3). 
Problem 
1 Tecnnlcal dMtcut11eS 
2 Dwersdty 01 largel group 
aehavlo' 
3 Targel grouo as a oer- 
cenlase of InP p a ~ ~ l a  
tlon ! I 4 Exten: oADehavlo.a1 
chance .eQured I 
Probably the most intluential articulation of the 
top-down perspective. comes from Daniel A. 
Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier (1983). 
Their model of implementation begins with three 
critical observations: a) policymaking is an 
iterative process of for~~lulc~tio~l,  r~~plerrzerztatiotz, 
N o n s t s l u l o ~  Variables 
Slructure Irnplernenta- Anectlnglrnplemenfatlon and reforr~z~llatiorz and the distinction between the 
I Soc.oeconon~c ond~. 
1 C.ear anc cons8slent 1 ! . o ~  and : e c l n o o ~ ~  
' oDlec!lves I : 2 D ~ c  8 C  SUDOOS 1 three should be maintained; b) the focus should 
2 1ncor~ora1,an at ace 3 Al:~!~Ces a ~ c  resou-ces I 
ouate cabsam theory 
3 Inottal allwallon 01 Ilnan. 
be on the attainment of the stated policy goals, 
I cia1 resouces 
1 r H~erarchjca',ntegratton although the ~ l l t p l l t . ~  of the implementing 
wlrhln and among Im. ' ~ lemen t~nq  ~nslllullons / 5 Decls~on rules 01 om. agencies and the outcorIzes of the inlplementation 
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slders 
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FIGURE 4: Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1 983) 
variables involved in the implementation process 
process are both important; and c)  imple- 
mentation can be viewed from three quite 
different perspectives-the initial policymaker or 
the cerzter, the field-level implementing officials 
or the periplzery, and the actors at whom the 
program is directed or the target gro~lp-but a 
center-focused perspective to implementation is 
preferred. 
In searching for the principal variables that affect implementation Mazmanian and Sabatier (pp. 
20-39) list a total of sixteen factors, clustered into three broad categories (see Figure 4): a) 
tractability of the problems (i.e. "some social problems are simply much easier to deal with 
than others"); b) ability of policy decision to structure inlplementation (i.e. "original 
policymakers can substantially affect the attainment of legal objectives by utilizing the levers at 
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their disposal"); and c) nonstatutory variables affecting implementation (i.e. "implementation 
also has an inherent political dynamism of its own"). 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (pp. 41-2) then go on to synthesize this large set of variables into a 
shorter list of six "sufficient and generally necessary" conditions for the effective 
implementation of legal objectives: a) clear and consistent objectives; b) adequate causal theo~y; 
c) legal structure to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups; d) 
conunitted and skillful implementing officials; e) support of interest groups and sovereigns; and 
f) changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially ilnderniine political support 
or causal theory. 
T H E  CHALLENGE FROM THE BOTTOM-UPPERS 
Concurrent to this refinement of the top-down 
model of implementation, a growing strearn of 
scholarship had already begun to question some of 
the assumptions of these models and highlighting 
the importance of factors that had either been 
ignored or deemed less critical. Rein and 
Rabinovitz (1978) implicitly challenged the 
0-0-0 hierarchical assumptions of the top-down model by 
t n\llllllll,.,ll l l  
P m . i , , r  lnlrllrmrlillllllrl proposing the 'principle of circularity ' .  
'-l' Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) built on this 
FlGURE5: NakamuraandSmallwo~d's(1980) principle to suggest their conception o f  the 
environments influencing implementation 
implementation process as a system on filnctional 
environments each of which contains a variety of actors and arenas and is connected to the 
others by various communications and compliance linkages (see Figure 5 ) .  
More importantly, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) shifted the focus to the actual practice (and, 
thereby, the practitioner) of policy. This led them to suggest that "implementation involves 
drift from declared purposes" (p. 309) and that "the process is [often] less one of slow 
incremental change than of bureaucratic entrepreneurship" (p. 331). Their theoretical 
perspective argued that: 
The politics o f  implementation is governed by at least three formal imperatives: ( I )  the respect for 
legal intent (legal rationality), which is (2) mediated by the concern for instrumental rationality as i t  is 
defined by c iv i l  servants yet (3) informed by the knowledge that action requires internal and external 
consensus. The politics o f  implementation may be best understood as an attempt to resolve conflicts 
among these imperatives. The way i n  which conflicts are resolved is a function o f  the purposes (their 
clarity, saliency, consistency), the resources (kind, level, and timing), and the cornplexity o f  the 
administrative process o f  implementation. (pp. 332-3). 
The implication that the field practitioner is a key determinant of implementation success was 
brought into sharp, and more explicit, relief with Paul Berman's (1978) distinction between 
macro- and micro-implementation; Richard F. Elmore's conception of backward mapping 
(1979); Michael Lipsky's (1980) exposition of street-level bureaucracies; Barrett and Fudge's 
(1981) description of implementation as a negotiation process; and the methodological 
development of an alternative bottom-up approach in Europe by Benny Hjern, Kenneth Hanf 
and their colleagues. 
The point of departure for Paul Berman's (1978) analysis is the generally accepted 
proposition that implementation 'success' depends on the complex interactions between the 
policy and its institutional setting. He proposes that the differences between the processes of 
macro- and micro-implementation arise from their distinct multiple-actor institutional settings. 
Macro-implementation is where the centrallfederal government must execute its policy to 
influence local delivery organizations, whereas micro-implementation is when, in response to 
the above actions, the local organizations have to devise and carry out their own internal 
policies. He portrays macro-implementation-where policies translate into project plans-as 
"taking place within a 'marble cake' of cooperative federalism, not the ideal 'layer cake' of 
coordinated federalism" (p. 165). 
The effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests, therefore, not with the original 
policymakers but with local deliverers who operate at the micro-implementation level. Micro- 
implementation is itself "a Russian doll of implementation-within-implementation" with at least 
three phases: mobilization, deliverer implementation, and institutionalization (p. 176-7). He 
suggests that implementation can follow four possible paths: a) nonimplementation, no 
adaptation in the project plan or in deliverer behavior; a) cooptation, no adaptation in deliverer 
behavior, but adaptation in the project to accommodate existing routines; c) technological 
learning, no adaptation of the project plan but adaptation of routinized behavior to 
accommodate the plan; or d) mutual adaptation, adaptation of both the project and deliverer 
behavior. Reporting on his own earlier empirical research (Berman and McLaughlin, 1977), 
he points out that projects were either adapted to local conditions or not implemented at all and 
that the only projects that seemed to produce effective outcomes were those whose paths 
showed mutual adaptation. 
One of Paul Berman's (1978: 179) conclusions was that, given the very nature of 
implementation, a single or simple retrospective theory of implementation was not likely-and 
if proposed should be treated with caution. Richard F. Elmore's (1978, 1979, 1985) work 
highlighted this view. In an important paper, Elmore (1978: 185-6) argued that understanding 
organizations is essential to the analysis of implementation and proposed four different models, 
each of which would give a distinctly different view of the implementation process:29 
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The systems management model treats organizations as value-maximizing units and views 
implementation as an ordered, goal-directed activity. The bureaucratic process model emphasizes the 
roles of discretion and routine in organizational behavior and views implementation as a process of 
continually controlling discretion and changing routine. The organizational development model treats 
the needs of individuals for participation and commitment as paramount and views implementation as a 
process in which implementers shape policies and claim them as their own. The corlflict and 
bargaining model treats organizations as arenas of conflict and views implementation as a bargaining 
process in which the participants converge on temporary solutions but no stable result is ever reached. 
In a subsequent paper, Elmore (1979: 602-3) distilled these models into two "clearly 
distinguishable" approaches to implementation analysis: forward mapping and backward 
mapping. Forward mapping "begins with an objective, it elaborates an increasingly specific set 
of steps for achieving that objective, and it states an outcome against which success or failure 
can be measured." His criticism of this approach was that it "reinforces the myth that 
implementation is controlled from the top" and implies unquestioningly that "policymakers 
control the organizational, political and technological processes that affect implementation." To 
Elmore, forward mapping "reinforces the pathologies of hierarchy" (p. 608). He therefore 
proposes backward mapping, which assumes that "the closer one is to the source of the 
problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of complex 
systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the 
problem is most immediate" (p. 605): 
[Backward mapping] begins not at the top of the implementation process but at the last possible stage, 
the point at which administrative actions intersect private choice. It begins, not with a statement of 
intent, but with a statement of the specific behavior at the lowest level of the implementation process 
that generates the need for a policy. Only after that behavior is described does the analysis presume to 
state an objective; the objective is first stated as a set of organizational operations and then as a set of 
effects, or outcomes, that will result from these operations. Having established a relatively precise 
target at the lowest level of the system, the analysis backs up through the structure of implementing 
agencies, asking at each level two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behavior that 
is the target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have that effect? In the 
final stage of analysis the analyst or policymaker describes a policy that directs resources at the 
organizational units likely to have the greatest effect. (p. 604). 
Implementation scholars had always known that lower level implementers enjoy discretionary 
powers, and some had seen this as a principal cause of the 'implementation problem' (e.g. 
Lowi, 1969; Linder and Peters, 1987). However, the contribution of Rein and Rabinovitz 
(1978), Berman (1978), and Elmore (1978, 1979) was to stress just how central the role of 
these field practitioners was to implementation and, more importantly, to suggest that some of 
this discretion was, in effect, inevitable-i.e., it was not a 'problem' that could, or even 
should, be 'fixed' but rather a reality of the implementation process that had to be 
acknowledged and accommodated. 
To Michael Lipsky (1978) this called for "standing the study of public policy 
implementation on its head." He fundamentally questioned the hierarchy assumption (i.e. that 
greater influence over policy is exerted by those who formulate it than by those who carry it 
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out) and proposed that in many cases "the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is 
so substantial that.. . policy is effectively 'made' by the people who implement it."30 What 
Wilson (1967) has called "front-line workers" and Berman (1978) labeled policy "deliverers", 
is defined by Lipsky (1980: 3) as street-level bureaucrats: "public service workers who interact 
directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the 
execution of their work." It is these street-level bureaucrats that Lipsky (1978: 398) sees as 
central to the study of implementation with "others in the policy arena provid[ing] the context in 
which they make their discretionary judgments." 
Also focusing on policy in 'action,' Barrett  and  Fudge (1981) propose that implementation 
should be seen as a political rather than a managerial process that happens through the dynamic 
negotiation (and interactions) between and within a) the (socio-economic) environmental 
system, b) the political system, and c) the organizational (or administrative) system. To them, 
the policy itself-what it is, where it comes from, how it is used-is the 'key' to the whole 
debate about implementation. However, the three critical issues in understanding 
implementation processes in action are: a) multiplicity and complexity of linkages; b) questions 
of control and coordination; and c) issues of conflict and consensus. Based on this 
conceptualization, they suggest (p. 29): 
The policy-action relationship needs to be considered in a political context and as an interactive and 
negotiative process taking place over time between those seeking to put policy into effect and those 
upon whom action depends. From this perspective, more emphasis is placed on issues of power and 
dependence, interests, motivations and behavior. 
Some of the most robust methodological rigor, empirical application, and analytical 
development of the bottom-up approach has come from West European scholars, particularly 
Benny Hjern  and Kenneth Hanf.31 Like Berman, Elmore, and Lipsky, these scholars 
have essentially attacked the hierarchy assumption of top-down models and faulted them for 
tending to "view things more from the perspective of central decision-makers than that of target 
group or the affected societal environment" (Hanf, 1982: 159; also see Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 
1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Knoepfel and Weidner, 
1982; Downing and Hanf, 1983b). 
Articulated variously as the 'organizational networks approach' (Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 1978), 
the 'implementation structures approach ' (Hjern and Porter, 198 1 ; Hanf, 1982) or as 'empirical 
constitutionalism' (Hjern and Hull, 1982), they have stressed that "politics and administration 
are so thoroughly intertwined that implementation research should not assume them to be 
distinct in the first place ... The ordering principle of implementation research is not policy 
problems as defined and addressed by the formal political system but as defined and addressed 
by relevant societal actors (who, of course, include those of the formal political system)" 
(Hjern and Hull, 1982: 1 14). 
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Downing and Hanf (1983: 333-4) point out that "we could view the initial legislative goal 
setting process as a first attempt at a bargain designed to resolve the [inevitable] conflicts 
[between relevant actors]. The interactive process by which the law is implemented can then be 
viewed as a way of refining that bargain by adapting to local conditions, constraints, and 
pressures.'' 
Arguing that "a focus on the formal organization of authority underestimates the influence and 
power that local decision makers can exert on the basis of their responsibility for middle range 
planning, their control over crucial information, their opportunity to 'coordinate from below' 
and their access to channels of political power" this set of scholarship suggests "the need for 
and the value of shifting the unit of analysis from the single organization or policy actor to the 
set of interrelationships that constitute the interorganizational network as such" (Hanf, 1978: 6, 
11). The factors considered important in shaping the pattern of interaction in the field include 
(Hanf, 1982: 169): a) socio-economic conditions; b) the 'pool' of relevant actors; and c) the 
problem structure (including the objective situation of the problem and the political evaluation 
of its seriousness). 
Empirically, their major question has been to explain-through detailed cross-country cases, 
including many on pollution policies-the observed "implementation deficit" (Scharpf and 
Hanf, 1978; Downing and Hanf, 1983a). The general conclusions match the list proposed by 
Hanf (1982: 169) for a subset of it, which suggests that often implementation of regulatory 
programs is: 
[a] multi-actor interactions process, that the interactions involve significant elements of strategic 
behavior and especially bargaining among key actors, that the patterns of interactions are shaped by 
actors pursuing different interests and objectives under constraints of mutual dependence and limited 
resources, and that the output of these interaction processes is frequently 'incomplete enforcement' 
when judged against the objectives stated in regulatory policy and subsequent programmatic statements. 
TOWARDS SYNTHESIS 
Developed largely as a reaction to the prevalent top-down thinking on implementation (see Box 
2)-especially its assumption of hierarchical control, its focus on legally-mandated aspects, 
and its underestimation of the politics of street-level actors and organizational interactions and 
bargaining-bottom-up implementation research has enriched the field both empirically and 
analytically. While not belittling the important differences that exist between scholars of the 
two traditions, there is also much that they have in common. As Berman (1978: 160) points 
out, "the article of faith that unites implementation analysts is a belief that the carrying out of a 
policy.. . is neither automatic nor assured." One might also add that there is general agreement 
that implementation is a complex, dynamic, multi-level, multi-actor, process influenced both by 
the content and context of the policy being implemented. The difference, in many instances, is 
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not as much about constellation of variables they use as about the relative importance of 
specific variables within specific cases of implementation-for example, the difference is not as 
much about whether implementation is a multi-actor, multi-organization process, but on which 
actors and organizations are the most relevant; furthermore, it is not about whether street-level 
bureaucrats and organizational networks are important as explanatory variables, but how 
important. 
One might argue that the 'principle of circularity' outlined by Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) 
implies that top-down and the bottom-up forces will often exist simultaneously in most 
implementation situations which are framed by pressures from both the top and the bottom. 
Also, depending on the particular features of particular implementation cases, one or the other 
approach may be more or less relevant. Finally, there is a growing consensus on the need to 
synthesize the major features of the two approaches and develop models that capture the 
strengths of both. (Knoepfel and Weidner, 1982; Elmore, 1985; Sabatier and Hanf, 1985; 
Sabatier, 1986; Goggin, et al., 1990). 
Bjorn Wittrock and Peter deLeon (1986: 48) believe that "we are witnessing a 
convergence of views. Both schools appear willing to view the different perspectives as 
complimentary rather than mutually exclusive .... [And] in some respects, the reputed 
distinction between a bottom-up and a top-down perspective is not clear-cut." While they do 
not propose a defined model of implementation, they do suggest that scholars should accept the 
"contextual" nature of policy and that "perhaps the one 'constant' in the policy process is 
change" (p. 55). They call, therefore, for "conceptual realismv-that is, for viewing policy as 
a moving target-which would shift the focus from attempting to understand policy either from 
a 'top' or 'bottom' perspective to understanding it from the perspective of "the changing 
contextuality in which problems exist" (p. 45). 
More in the way of actually combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches is the work of 
Richard Elmore (1985) who introduces the concept of reversible logic in synthesizing his 
earlier work on 'backward' and 'forward' mapping. This approach argues that the policy 
practitioner must consider both the legally mandated policy instruments and resources (top- 
down) and the environment in which the target groups operate (bottom-up) because 
implementers are going to experience pressures from both sources and because success will 
depend on combining the two. 
A more elaborate 'theory-building' attempt at synthesis is undertaken by Paul Sabatier 
(1986) who suggests an advocacy coalition framework of policy change (Figure 6). The focus 
of this model-and in some ways the 'glue' that binds the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
within it-is advocacy coalitions defined as "actors from various public and private 
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